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1. Canada’s Evolving National Security Policy
There are many reasons why Canadians may be tempted into thinking the ongoing 
Parliamentary review of the Anti-terrorism Act1 (ATA) is not of pressing importance. 
The ATA has been used sparingly with so far only one person charged under its new 
terrorism offences during its first three years of existence.2 The Supreme Court of 
Canada has upheld the constitutionality of investigative hearings, one of the most 
controversial new investigative powers in the ATA.3 The security certificate process 
in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act4 (IRPA) was also used more fre­
quently than charges under the ATA as a means of detaining and apprehending ter­
rorist suspects. In addition, the IRPA was used to allow judges to consider informa­
tion that affects national security and international relations without disclosure to the 
suspect and full adversarial challenge. The government’s relative restraint in employ­
ing anti-terrorism legislation should be factored into the three year review process. 
However, in my view these developments do not obviate the need for a searching and 
critical examination of the ATA and related laws. Moreover, I suggest that lawmak­
ers can make some concrete amendments to restrain the ATA and related laws and 
make them fairer and more consistent with the goals of Canada’s national security 
policy, including the important policy of non-discrimination.
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1 S.C. 2001, c. 41,8.145.
2 One person, Mohammad Momin Khawaja, has been charged with participating in the activities of a 
terrorist group and facilitating a terrorist activity under ss.83.18 and 83.19 of the Criminal Code.
3 Application re Section 83.28 o f the Criminal Code, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248.
4 S.C. 2001, c.27.
Since the controversial enactment of the ATA in 2001,5 the Canadian govern­
ment has developed a broader and more comprehensive national security policy that 
includes a formal policy “Securing an Open Society” embracing an all-risks 
approach to the range of man-made and natural risks to the security of Canadians.6 
The government also created a new Public Safety Ministry7, and enacted other pieces 
of legislation such as the Public Safety Act8 to complement the criminal sanctions 
that are the main focus of the ATA. The government has indicated that it will create 
a new National Security Committee of Parliamentarians to review the government’s 
security and intelligence activities9 and the ongoing Arar Commission is examining 
the adequacy of review of the RCMP’s national security activities.10
The ATA now forms only part of Canada’s national security policy. To its cred­
it, the Canadian government has officially recognized that terrorism is not only the 
only threat to the security of Canadians. It has introduced a comprehensive all risks 
national security policy that acknowledges the threats that diseases such as SARS 
and natural disasters can cause to the security of Canadians.11 Although Canada has 
fortunately not suffered the terrorist attacks of the type that affected New York, 
Washington, Bali and Madrid, threats of terrorism still exist and Osama bin Laden 
has named Canada as one of the countries on A1 Qaeda’s hit list.12
5 The ATA has already been subject to considerable academic commentary. See for example Ronald J. 
Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach, eds., The Security o f Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti- 
Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) [The Security o f Freedom]-, D. Daubney et 
al, eds., Terrorism, Law and Democracy: How Canada is Changing After September 11 (Montreal: Edi­
tions Thémis, 2002) [Terrorism, Law and Democracy]', “Special Issue” (2002) 14 N.J.C.L. 3; K. Roach, 
“Canada’s New Anti-Terrorism Law” [2002] S.J.L.S. 122; D. Paciocco, “Constitutional Casualties of 
September 11: Limiting the Legacy of the Anti-Terrorism Act” (2002) 16 S.C.L.R. (2d) 185 
[“Constitutional Casualties of September 11”]; D. Jenkins, “In Support of Canada’s Anti-Terrorism 
Law: A Comparison of Canadian, British and American Anti-Terrorism Law” (2003) 66 Sask. L. Rev. 
419 [Jenkins],
6 Canada, Privy Council Office, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy, April 
2004
7 Bill C-6, An Act to establish the Department o f Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and to 
amend or repeal certain Acts, 1st Sess., 38th Pari., 2004 (assented to 23 March 2005), S.C. 2005, C. 
10.
8 S.C. 2004, c. 15.
9 “Deputy Prime Ministers Details Proposed Model for National Security Committee o f 
Parliamentarians” (5 April 2005), online: <http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/publications/news/2005/ 
20050404-3_e.asp>.
10 Canada, Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, 
Policy Review Consultation Paper (October 2004).
11 For a defence of such an all-risk human security approach see K. Roach, September 11: 
Consequences fo r Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003) c. 7.
'2 Ibid. at 7.
The ATA appears destined to remain an important part of Canada’s national 
security policy, despite the fact that existing criminal offences such as murder, con­
spiracy, attempts, and counseling would catch most acts of terrorism. Certain aspects 
of the ATA like the criminalization of the financing of terrorism are necessary to ful­
fill Canada’s international commitments under various international conventions and 
resolutions relating to terrorism. The issue that remains is: Has the ATA has been opti­
mally structured to fulfill these commitments and contribute to Canadian and inter­
national security while at the same time respecting the rights and values of Canada 
as a free, pluralistic and democratic society? In what follows, I focus on possible 
amendments to the ATA with respect to the definition of terrorism, various offences, 
the process of listing groups and individuals as terrorists, and the important role that 
anti-discrimination principles should play in Canada’s national security policy. I will 
also examine the treatment of non-citizens suspected of terrorism and propose that 
security cleared special advocates under both the IRPA and the ATA could increase 
the fairness and accuracy of decisions made on the basis of national security infor­
mation not disclosed to the affected party.
2. The Need for Greater Restraint in the Definition of Terrorism
In Suresh v. Canada13, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized the difficulty of 
defining terrorism. It commented that:
one searches in vain for an authoritative definition of “terrorism”. The 
Immigration Act does not define the term. Further, there is no single definition 
that is accepted internationally. The absence of an authoritative definition means 
that, at least at the margins, ‘the term is open to politicized manipulation, con­
jecture, and polemical interpretation’...Perhaps the most striking example of the 
politicized nature of the term is that Nelson Mandela’s African National 
Congress was, during the apartheid era, routinely labelled a terrorist organiza­
tion, not only by the South African government but by much of the internation­
al community.
After recognizing the difficulties of defining terrorism, the Court came up with its 
own definition of terrorism which it then read into the undefined reference to terror­
ism in IRPA. It concluded that:
following the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism, that “terrorism” in s. 19 of the Act includes any ‘act intended to cause 
death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an 
active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of
13 [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 94-95.
such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any 
act’. This definition catches the essence of what the world understands by ‘ter­
rorism’. Particular cases on the fringes of terrorist activity will inevitably pro­
voke disagreement. Parliament is not prevented from adopting more detailed or 
different definitions of terrorism.14
Although the Court noted that Parliament could enact a different definition, it is sig­
nificant that they selected a much simpler and narrower definition of terrorism than 
is found in s.83.01 ( 1 )(b) of the ATA. Although that definition does not in itself create 
a crime, it is incorporated into many of the offences and investigative powers found 
in the ATA. It defines a terrorist activity as:
(b) an act or omission, in or outside Canada,
(i) that is committed
(A) in whole or in part for a political, religious or ideological pur­
pose, objective or cause, and
(B) in whole or in part with the intention of intimidating the public, 
or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including 
its economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a 
domestic or an international organization inside or outside 
Canada, and
(ii) that intentionally
(A) causes death or serious bodily harm to a person by the use of vio­
lence
(B) endangers a person’s life
(C) causes a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or any 
segment of the public
(D) causes substantial property damage, whether to public or private 
property, if causing such damage is likely to result in the conduct 
or harm referred to in any of clauses A) to C) or,
(E) causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an 
essential service, facility or system, whether public or private, 
other than as a result of advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of 
work that is not intended to result in the conduct or harm referred 
to in any of clauses A) to C).
14 Ibid. at para. 98.
and includes a conspiracy, attempt, or threat to commit any such act or 
omission, or being an accessory after the fact or counselling in relation to 
any such act or omission, but, for greater certainty, does not include an act 
or omission that is committed during an armed conflict and that, at the time 
and in the place of its commission, is in accordance with customary inter­
national law or conventional international law applicable to the conflict, or 
the activities undertaken by military forces of a state in the exercise of their 
official duties, to the extent that those activities are governed by other rules 
of international law.
1.1 For greater certainty, the expression of a political, religious or ideological 
thought, belief or opinion does not come within paragraph (b) of the defi­
nition ‘terrorist activity’ in subsection 1 unless it constitutes an act or omis­
sion that satisfies the criteria of that paragraph.
One possibility that should be considered in the three year review is to replace the 
broad15 and confusing16 definition of terrorism in the ATA with the far more succinct 
and narrower definition of terrorism used by the Supreme Court of Canada in Suresh
v. Canada and now supported by a recent UN proposal.17 The Suresh definition 
focuses on acts intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians. The ATA 
focuses on the broader and vaguer concept of endangering a person’s life or causing 
a serious risk to health and safety, and includes substantial property damage that is 
likely to cause such harms. The Suresh definition should be broad enough to cover 
acts of biological or nuclear terrorism that would otherwise be covered in the ATA by 
reference to endangerment of life and health and safety. The Suresh definition would 
not cover substantial property damage that was likely to cause death, danger to life, 
health or safety unless the accused intended to cause death or serious bodily injury
15 Section 83.01(l)(a) contains a long and complex definition of terrorist activities that incorporates 
various offences under s.7 of the Criminal Code but only to the extent that they implement various 
international conventions against the unlawful seizure of aircraft, crimes against internationally pro­
tected persons, the taking of hostages, crimes in relation to nuclear materials, terrorist bombings and 
the financing of terrorism.
16 The Department of Justice’s focus groups of minority views on the ATA reported that its summary of 
the definition of terrorism “was probably the most confusing and difficult to understand in most groups. 
Some participants seemed a bit overwhelmed by the complexity o f even the summarized definition. For 
those who approved outright, the definition was thought to be clear and if not, it was a good frame­
work, and was at least heading in the right direction, filling a gap....For others, the provision was too 
broad, too vague and subject to interpretation, and could therefore harm innocent people in 3 main 
ways- relating to intention, legitimate protest and the targeting of ethnic minorities.” Canada, 
Department of Justice, Minority Views on the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act (31 March, 2003) at 4.3.2.
17 The recent UN proposal states: “any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or 
serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or 
compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing an act.” 
“Terrorism defined in UN proposal” Globe and Mail (22 March 2005) A16.
to another person. For this reason, it may be advisable to clarify that the intent 
referred to in the Suresh definition would include knowledge that death or bodily 
injury was likely to occur. Even with respect to the most serious offences such as 
murder, knowledge of the prohibited act is a sufficient form of fault.
The Suresh definition of terrorism also does not include one of the more con­
troversial aspects of the ATA’s definition, namely the reference in s.83.01(b)(1)(E) to 
serious interference or disruption of essential public and private services. This clause 
was an expansion of a reference in the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act, 2000 to the 
disruption of an electronic system and is so broad that it requires qualification by an 
exemption for “advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work that is not intended” 
to endanger life or health or safety. As originally introduced, Bill C-36 only exempt­
ed such dissent if it was “lawful”, but this was changed after critics raised concerns 
that the act could define unlawful strikes and protests as terrorism. If, as the Supreme 
Court claims, the narrower Suresh definition of terrorism captures the essence of 
what the world understands as terrorism, it is not clear why serious disruptions of 
public or private services should be defined as terrorism if they are not acts intended 
to cause death or serious bodily injury to civilians. This is not to say that such dis­
ruptions of essential public or private services should not be illegal or criminal;18 
rather it is to question the value of including them in the definition of terrorist activ­
ities.
My concerns about overbreadth in the definition of terrorism are both norma­
tive ones about civil liberties and practical ones about limited resources. 
Normatively, democracies risk losing the moral high ground if they adopt overbroad 
definitions of terrorism that could apply to even illegal forms of dissent. Much of the 
opposition to the ATA in civil society among groups such as labour unions and 
Aboriginal groups might have been significantly diminished if clause E had never 
been included in the definition of terrorist activities.
On a practical level, security concerns about real terrorism are serious enough 
that the police and others should not be distracted into thinking that street protests by 
the anti-globalization movements, strikes concerning essential services, Aboriginal 
blockades or the destruction of property by the radical arms of animal rights or envi­
ronmental groups are forms of terrorism. Before and after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, the world knew that the essence of terrorism was the murder and
18 In this respect it should be noted that the ATA adds new specific offences to the Criminal Code relat­
ing to explosives in places of public use that applies if the accused has the intent to cause death or seri­
ous bodily injury or the intent to cause extensive destruction that results or is likely to result in major 
economic loss. See Criminal Code s.431.2. See also a new offence of mischief relating to religious 
property in Criminal Code s.430(4.1). The ATA also amends offences relating to attacks on the prem­
ises of internationally protected persons and United Nations personnel. See Criminal Code ss.431, 
431.1.
maiming of innocent civilians and that such activities should be defined as terrorism. 
Parliamentarians conducting the three year review of the ATA should give serious 
consideration to the Suresh definition of terrorism.
If the adoption of the Suresh definition is seen as too drastic a measure, 
Parliamentarians should at least consider the previous recommendation of Irwin 
Cotier that subsection E referring to the serious disruption of essential public and pri­
vate services be removed from the definition of terrorism.19 Again the point is both 
that such a reform would lessen concerns about overbreadth and the targeting of dis­
sent, and that it also allows for a sharper focus on the greatest threats.
Another important reform of the ATA’s definition of terrorist activities would 
be to remove the reference in s.83.01(b)(l)(A) to the requirement for proof that the 
accused acted for a political, religious or ideological purpose, objective or cause. As 
I have argued elsewhere, this clause runs counter to the basic criminal law principle 
that motive is not an essential element of a criminal offence.20 It raises concerns that 
police and others may focus attention on those who share political or religious beliefs 
with terrorists. Such concerns were partially addressed by an amendment made after 
the introduction of the ATA. This amendment provides that “for greater certainty, the 
expression of a political, religious or ideological thought, belief, or opinion” does not 
constitute a terrorist activity unless it otherwise satisfies that definition.21 Although 
this amendment provides some restrictions, it seems anomalous that the definition of 
terrorism is so broad that an exemption for religious or political thought, belief or 
opinion is required. Surely such a plurality of thought and speech is at the heart of 
any free and democratic society, especially one that claims the high ground in a war 
with political and religious extremists.
The abolition of the political and religious motive requirement also has practi­
cal benefits. Any trial of an offence based on this definition of terrorist activity has 
to focus on proof of the accused’s religious or political motive beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In my view, the more appropriate stance at a terrorism trial would be that no 
motive, including any political or religious motive, excuses the commission of a 
criminal act. Requirement of proof of religious or political motive complicates what
'9 Professor Irwin Cotier has recommended that subsection E be removed “to preclude any untoward 
application of the Act to civil disobedience or even violent conduct that is clearly not terrorist activi­
ty.” I. Cotier, “Terrorism, Security and Rights: The Dilemma of Democracies” (2002) 14 N.J.C.L. 13 
at 36. He added, however, that reference to electronic systems perhaps be added to D.
20 K. Roach, “Did September 11 Change Everything: Struggling to Preserve Canadian Values in the 
Face of Terrorism” (2002) 47 McGill L.J. 893 at 903-906.
21 The most likely concern is that an expression of political or religious belief or opinion could be said 
in some cases to constitute a “threat” to commit a terrorist activity. Note that terrorism activity includes 
not only conspiracies, attempts, and counseling to commit such activities but also the vaguer and less 
well settled concept of a “threat” to commit terrorist activities.
are already extremely complicated proceedings.22 Evidence of religious and political 
motive was allowed in the Air India trial under the regular criminal law relating to 
murder23, but the trial judge ultimately held that many others in the community 
would have similar motives to commit acts of terrorism against Indian targets in 
1985. In this respect, evidence of motive did not substantially advance the Crown’s 
case. There is, however, a danger that a jury might have given politcal and religious 
motive evidence a disproportionate weight.24 The requirement for proof of religious 
or political motive may also provide an accused with a platform for running a polit­
ical or religious defence that might not otherwise be relevant in an ordinary criminal 
trial.
While a repeal of the political and religious motive element of terrorism 
offences would simplify terrorism trials, it would also effectively broaden the defi­
nition of terrorist activities. This prompts concerns about whether terrorist activities 
could be adequately distinguished from other forms of crime. This is of particular 
concern given the additional investigative and punitive powers available to prosecute 
an offence under the ATA.25 The answer to this concern, however, is found in 
s.83.01 (l)(b)(I)(B) which provides that a terrorist activity must be committed with 
the intention of intimidating the public with regard to its security including its eco­
nomic security and to compel any person, government, international or domestic 
organization inside or outside of Canada from acting or refraining to act. This sec­
tion avoids the dangers of singling out religious and political motives for special 
scrutiny and focuses on aggravating external circumstances of the activities as 
opposed to the internal motivations of the accused.
At the same time, there are legitimate concerns that the above provision itself 
is much broader than similar requirements found in the Suresh definition and in relat­
ed international law definitions of terrorism. The Suresh definition is more narrowly
22 The Commonwealth Secretariat has recognized that not including a political and religious motiva­
tion requirement “reflects a policy approach where the act and purpose alone constitute ‘terrorism’ and 
the motivation is of no relevance. This approach is also easier to apply in practice, as there is no 
requirement to prove motivation as an element of the offence. As well, such an approach is consistent 
with the definition in the Convention on the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism....” It prepared 
two alternative definitions of terrorism, one including motive and the other not, concluding that “this 
was a fundamental policy decision that each country would need to make.” Commonwealth Secretariat 
M odel Legislative Provisions on Measures to Combat Terrorism (September 2002) at 42.
23 R. v. Malik and Bagri, 2005 BCSC 350 at paras. 222-224, 303, 309, 348-353, 445-454, 529, 595- 
596.
24 A public opinion poll suggest that 68% of respondents that had an opinion disagreed with the trial 
judge’s verdict of an acquittal. “Poll finds most in B.C. reject Air-India verdict” Globe and Mail (31 
March 2005) A l.
25 S. Cohen, “Safeguards in and Justifications for Canada’s New Anti-terrorism Act” (2002) 14 
N.J.C.L. 99 at 121-2; S. Cohen, “Policing Security: The Divide Between Crime and Terror” (2004) 15 
N.J.C.L. 405.
tailored because it refers only to the concept of intimidating a population without ref­
erence to the vague concept of security which is made only vaguer and broader by 
reference to economic security. The Suresh definition also focuses on attempts to 
influence governments or international organizations, in contrast to the ATA's broad­
er reference to attempts to influence any person, including individuals and corpora­
tions, and any domestic organizations, including unincorporated entities.
Some may argue that we have already paid too much attention to the legal def­
inition of terrorism and dismiss debates about the definition of terrorism as a legal­
istic distraction. I believe that such an approach is mistaken. The ATA's definition of 
what constitutes a terrorist activity is incorporated in many of the ATA's new offences 
as well as in new investigative powers that relate to preventive arrest and investiga­
tive hearings. For reasons of protecting civil liberties, including the rights of politi­
cal and religious dissent, and for reasons of concentrating on the essence of what the 
world understands as terrorism, it is important that Canada’s definition of terrorism 
be as precise and focused as possible.
3. The Need for Greater Restraint in Defining Offences
The exact scope of the new terrorism offences in the ATA remains somewhat unclear 
because of the absence of judicial interpretation to date. In my view, there are some 
offences in the ATA that are overbroad in relation to Canada’s obligations to honour 
its international commitments to combat terrorism. These offences are found both in 
the Criminal Code amendments and in the new Security of Information Act enacted 
as part of the ATA.
Many of the new financing offences in the ATA are required by the 1999 
International Convention on the Suppression o f Terrorist Financing and the UN 
Security Council Resolution 1373 which placed great emphasis on combating terror­
ist financing. Yet some offences under the ATA may be overbroad because they apply 
to transactions with terrorist groups even though the accused has no knowledge of or 
nexus with terrorist activities. For example s.83.03(b) prohibits making “property or 
financial or other relating services” available “knowing that, in whole or part, they 
will be used by or will benefit a terrorist group.” Does this mean that those who pro­
vide medical or legal services to a person knowing that they will benefit a terrorist 
group are themselves guilty of a terrorism offence? Similar concerns apply to the 
prohibition on dealing with the property of terrorists in s.83.08.
The fairness of s. 83.1 is another issue to consider. Section 83.1 makes it a 
crime punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment for any person in Canada and any 
Canadian abroad not to disclose to the Commissioner of the RCMP and/or the 
Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service; (1) the existence of property 
in their possession or control that they know is owned or controlled by a terrorist
group or (2) information about a proposed transaction involving such property. In 
addition, there is a separate obligation under s.7.1 of the Proceeds o f Crime (Money 
Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act to make a report to FINTRAC. This offence 
punishes a failure to act, namely a failure to report to various law enforcement bod­
ies. It goes beyond the special and appropriate duties placed on financial institutions 
with regard to reporting suspicious financial transactions under s.83.11. The offence 
could even apply to lawyers despite the importance of solicitor-client privilege and 
on that basis was opposed by both the Canadian Bar Association and the Federation 
of Law Societies of Canada.26
The forfeiture procedures apply to all terrorist property and not just property 
related to terrorist activities. All that is required for forfeiture is proof on a balance 
of probabilities in Federal Court. The proof may include the use of hearsay evidence 
that cannot be the subject of cross-examination and the property forfeited could 
include the retainers of lawyers and dwelling houses shared with others. Although 
there is a long history of the forfeiture of property used in respect of crime, the ATA 
constitutes an extension of civil forfeiture powers into the criminal law.27 Some of 
the difficult questions that could arise in forfeiture proceedings as a result of this 
departure from the criminal law’s appropriate focus on individual responsibility can 
be seen in the exemptions contemplated for innocent third parties. These exemptions 
purport to protect those who are “not a member of a terrorist group”28 and family 
members of accused terrorists who may not have their house forfeited if they appear 
“innocent of any complicity or collusion in the terrorist activity.”29 It is, of course, 
not illegal in Canada to be a member of a terrorist group or to appear to be complic- 
it with terrorist activities.
The offence in s.83.18 relating to participation in the activities of a terrorist 
group contains numerous subsections that seem designed to ensure a broad interpre­
tation of the offence. Information such as the accused’s frequent association with 
persons who constitute the terrorist group or the accused’s use of a name, word or 
symbol associated with a terrorist group is deemed to be relevant as proof of the 
offence. The net effect of these and other similar provisions30 is a restriction on the 
ability of judges to interpret the offence, to determine the relevancy of evidence, and 
to balance the relevancy and prejudicial value of evidence in specific trials. It is 
preferable to leave such matters open to judicial interpretation in a case by case man-
26 R. Hubbard et al., Money Laundering and Proceeds o f Crime (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004) at 666.
27 Ibid. at 579.
28 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.83.14(8)
2? Ibid. s.83.14(9).
30 Ibid. ss.83.19(2), 83.21(2), 83.22(2).
ner. Further, ss. 83.18(2)(3) and (4) could all be repealed without affecting the pri­
mary decision to criminalize knowing participation in the activities of a terrorist 
group for the purpose of facilitating the commission of terrorist activities.
One of the deeming provisions in the ATA, section 83.19(2) severely qualifies 
the fault requirement that an accused must knowingly facilitate a terrorist activity. 
The section provides that it is not necessary that “any particular terrorist activity was 
foreseen or planned at the time it was facilitated.” This provision may well under­
mine the important fault requirement for facilitation, a factor that becomes even more 
important since the definition of facilitation is also incorporated into the definition of 
a terrorist group.31 This and other deeming sections could be repealed and we can 
trust that the courts will adopt a reasonable and purposive interpretation of the basic 
offence.32 Such amendments would also have the considerable benefit of simplifying 
an act that is extremely complex.
The Public Safety Act added a new crime of hoaxing terrorist activity to the list 
of terrorist activities. Although a hoax may cause the same level of public fear as a 
real terrorist attack, it is not clear that the hoaxer has the same level of culpability as 
the person who is actually involved in terrorism. The issue is not whether a terrorist 
hoax should be illegal, because it is surely already covered by mischief offences. 
However, the issue is whether the hoaxer should be exposed to the special stigma and 
punishment attached to the commission of a terrorist offence. Under s.83.231 of the 
Criminal Code a person can be guilty of this new crime on the basis that they intend­
ed “serious interference with the lawful use of operation of property.” If a death 
unfortunately results from the offence, the hoaxer is guilty of an aggravated offence 
punishable by imprisonment to life even though he or she may have had no subjec­
tive or objective fault in causing the death.
An important part of the ATA that largely escaped critical scrutiny at the time 
of enactment was the expansion of the Official Secrets Act, re-named the Security o f 
Information Act (SIA). In general, the ATA expanded the SIA by adding various 
forms of communications with terrorist groups to the wide array of offences that 
relate to communication with and assistance to foreign powers. The definition of 
“terrorist group” is the same as under the ATA and includes listed entities.
Parliament has defined as prejudicial to the safety and interests of the State the 
commission of a terrorist activity as it is broadly defined in the ATA and the com­
mission of any offence to benefit a terrorist group that is punishable under either
31 Ibid. s.83.01 (2)
32 See for example David Jenkin’s suggestion that s.83.18(4) can “risk inappropriately scrutiny of mere 
association and political expression not connected with unlawful activities” and that it could be 
“dropped altogether in favour of reliance upon normal rules o f evidence.” Jenkins, supra note 5 at 444.
provincial or federal law by a maximum of two years imprisonment. In addition, the 
commission in Canada of any offence under the laws of either Canada or a province 
of an offence punishable by a maximum of two years imprisonment “in order to 
advance a political, religious or ideological purpose objective or cause” is included 
in the definition of “prejudicial to the safety or interests of the state”, even if there is 
no connection with terrorist activity. It is not clear why all offences that are commit­
ted with a political or religious motivation are singled out for special treatment under 
the act especially when the offences are not committed to benefit either a foreign 
entity or a terrorist group. Singling out crimes committed for religious and political 
purposes even if not connected with terrorism as subject to the special strictures of 
the SIA seems especially heavy-handed. In a democracy, a crime is a crime but polit­
ical crimes should not be treated more harshly.33
The definition of prejudice to Canada also includes “interfering with a serv­
ice, facility, system or computer program, whether public or private...in a manner 
that has significant adverse impact on the health, safety, security or economic or 
financial well-being of the people of Canada or the functioning of any government 
in Canada” (s.3(l)(d)) and adversely affecting “the stability of the Canadian econo­
my, the financial system or any financial market in Canada without reasonable eco­
nomic or financial justification” (s.3(l)(k). Such clauses define national security 
interests in an extremely broad fashion to include conduct that harms the economic 
stability of Canada. As with the definition of terrorist activity in the ATA, much could 
be gained both in terms of civil liberties and focusing limited resources by defining 
the state’s national security interests in a narrower, more tightly-focused, fashion.
Another problem with the SIA is the extraordinary breadth of some of its 
offences. Section 20 creates an indictable offence punishable by life imprisonment 
that applies to every person who at the direction, for the benefit or in association with 
a foreign entity or a terrorist group, induces or attempts to induce, by threat, accusa­
tion, menace or violence, any person to do anything or to cause anything to be done 
to increase the capacity of the foreign entity or terrorist group to harm Canadian 
interests or is itself likely to harm Canadian interests. Note that the triggering con­
duct need not be a crime involving violence or threats thereof, but includes accusa­
tions, menaces and threats that may not otherwise be illegal. In addition, the conduct 
sought falls under the very broad definition of prejudicing the safety or interests of 
Canada. Although it is important that people are protected against violence and 
threats thereof by terrorist groups, s.20 is so broadly worded that it could apply to 
impassioned political speech in Canada or abroad about political struggles abroad if 
such speech amounts to an accusation, menace or threat. Even if such an offence was
33 See K.Roach, “Anti-Terrorism and Militant Democracy: Some Western and Eastern Responses” in 
A. Sajo, ed., Militant Democracy (Amsterdam: Eleven Publishing, 2004).
ultimately read down by the courts, its existence could still chill impassioned politi­
cal speech.
The broadly defined prohibited conduct in s.20, as well as in other broadly 
defined SIA offences relating to the communication of safeguarded information, is 
further expanded by s.22 which deems a wide range of preparatory acts to be 
offences punishable by up to two years imprisonment. The preparatory acts include 
entering into Canada, obtaining, retaining or gaining access to any information, or 
possessing any device to conceal the content of information or to surreptitiously 
communicate the information. These acts of preparation are above and beyond the 
separate inchoate offences of attempting, conspiring, counseling or being an acces­
sory after the fact to any offence under the SIA.34 Canada already broadly defines the 
law of attempted crimes35 and it is not clear that such a broad range of acts in prepa­
ration for crimes should themselves be crimes. The three year review should closely 
examine the SIA to ensure that it is not overbroad in relation to Canada’s legitimate 
national security interests in prohibiting the communication of vital information to 
foreign entities and terrorist groups.
4. The Need for Increased Fairness in the Listing of Terrorist 
Groups and Individuals
Lists of groups and individuals found by various executive bodies to be terrorists are 
an important element of recent antiterrorism efforts. Such lists are often used by the 
United Nations and other bodies to stop the financing of terrorism. Section 83.05 of 
the ATA enables Cabinet to assemble a list of entities on the recommendation of the 
Solicitor General where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person, 
group or unincorporated association or organization36 knowingly carried out, 
attempted, participated or facilitated a terrorist activity or is acting on behalf of such 
an association or in association with a terrorist group. Although this definition is very 
broad, so far only thirty-five associations are listed as terrorist entities. There are pro­
visions for notice and subsequent judicial and executive review of the listing37 after 
it is made, but the legislation does not provide an opportunity for notice or adversar­
ial challenge to the government’s case before the listing is made.
34 Security o f Information Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 0 -5 , s.23.
35 R. v. Deutsch, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 2.
36 Note that “entity” is defined in s.83.01(l) of the ATA.
37 In this respect, s.83.07 of the ATA is particularly important as it provides for prompt executive review 
in cases of mistaken identity. A similar provision is found in the United Nations Suppression of  
Terrorist Financing Regulations, S.O.R./2ÛO 1-360 but unlike s.83.07 does not require a response from 
the executive within 15 days.
Many more persons have been listed under the United Nations Suppression of 
Terrorism Regulations38 on the basis that there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
they have carried out, attempted to carry out or participated or facilitated in the car­
rying out of a terrorist activity. Once a person is listed, it becomes an offence to have 
provide financial services to that person. There was at least one case in which a per­
son was listed, but subsequently removed because of concerns that he was wrongly 
listed.39 The ability to list a group and a person as a terrorist is a strong executive 
power and there are concerns that this power will be used in error. Ex ante adversar­
ial challenge would be an important restraint on this strong power.
Although ex post judicial review of executive listing decisions should be 
retained, much of the harm is done once a person is publicly and officially listed as 
a terrorist. Ex ante adversarial review of listing decisions is especially important 
given the possibility that evidence used by the judge in the ex post judicial review 
may never be disclosed or even summarized because of concerns about the national 
security nature of the information. In some cases, advance notice to the actual person 
or group about to be listed may be impractical or imprudent but it should be possible 
to give advance notice to special advocates that can test and challenge the govern­
ment’s case. This proposal will be discussed in greater depth below.
A related objectionable feature of the ATA is that simply being a “listed entity” 
automatically makes a group a “terrorist group” within the meaning of the Act. This 
means that, in the context of a subsequent criminal proceeding, it may not be possi­
ble for a listed group to prove that it is not a terrorist group.40 Parliament should 
make clear that the prosecution must prove all elements of a terrorism offence 
beyond a reasonable doubt, including that the listed group is in fact a terrorist group. 
The prosecution should not be able to rely on the Cabinet’s listing decision as con­
clusive proof of the existence of one of the essential elements of a new terrorist 
offence in the ATA. Additionally, the Cabinet should only have the power to list 
groups, and not individuals, as terrorists in this fashion because the determination of 
individual culpability in a democracy is a matter for judges, not Cabinet or the 
Legislature.
38 S.O.R./2001-360
39 E. Alexandra Dosman, “For the Record, Designating ‘Listed Entities’ for the Purposes of Terrorist 
Financing Offences at Canadian Law” (2004) 62 U.T.Fac.L.Rev. 1 at 15-19.
40 “Constitutional Causalities of September 11,” supra note 5.
5. The Need for Commitment to Anti-Discrimination Principles
The ATA included new provisions that allow for the deletion of hate propaganda from 
the Internet and that create a new offence of mischief to religious property if that mis­
chief is motivated by “bias, prejudice, or hate based on religion, race, colour or 
national or ethnic origin”.41 The inclusion of such provisions in anti-terrorism legis­
lation is based on a belief that racial and religious animus play an important role in 
many forms of terrorism. The treatment of discrimination in the ATA, however, was 
one sided. It provided the state with new tools to apprehend and punish private con­
duct that resulted in racial discrimination, but it did not recognize that the state itself 
could engage in discriminatory conduct. There is a need to reaffirm anti-discrimina- 
tion principles in the post 9/11 context where there is a risk that some forms of ter­
rorism are associated with particular religions, races and nationalities.
The failure of the ATA to address the danger of discrimination from the state 
is particularly striking given that when the present Minister of Justice, Irwin Cotier, 
was a back bencher, he called for an anti-discrimination clause to be added to the 
ATA after it was first introduced 42 The government subsequently created a “Cross- 
Cultural Roundtable on Security... comprised of members of ethno-cultural and reli­
gious communities from across Canada”. The roundtable will “engage in a long-term 
dialogue to improve understanding on how to manage security interests in a diverse 
society”.43 In my view, it is consistent with this policy to include some form of non­
discrimination clause in the ATA.
A properly constructed anti-discrimination clause might respond to fears that 
people of Arab origin and/or adherents of the Islamic faith could be the subject of dis­
criminatory application of the broad offences and investigative powers under the 
ATA. If a general amendment applied to all investigative activities in the Criminal 
Code, this could also respond to concerns about racial profiling of Aboriginal peo­
ple, African-Canadians and other groups.44 The anti-discrimination clause would
41 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.430(4.1)
42 Professor Cotier, then a backbencher, wrote: “There is a potential in the expansive powers of the Act 
for possible singling out o f visible minorities for differential treatment. The inclusion of a non-dis­
crimination clause respecting the application of the Act in matters of arrest, detention and impris­
onment would have important as well as substantive value. Such a provision now exists in section 
4(b) of the Emergencies Act....and it would seem desirable to include such a provision in this Bill.” 
Irwin Cotier, “Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counter-Terrorism Law and 
Policy” in Daniels, Macklem and Roach, eds., The Security o f Freedom (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2001) at 128.
43 Supra note 6 at 2.
44 See Ontario Human Rights Commission, Paying the Price: The Human Costs o f Racial Profiling 
(Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2003); Johnson v. Halifax (Regional Municipality) 
Police Service [2003] N.S.H.R.B.I.D. No. 2.
allow Parliament to make a clear and principled statement that common law or statu­
tory powers should not be used in a manner that results in discriminatory profiling.45
Several important design issues arise with the inclusion of an anti-discrimina- 
tion clause. Irwin Cotier previously suggested a general anti-discrimination clause of 
the type in the Emergencies A c t46 This clause was included in recognition of the 
injustice suffered by people of Japanese origin interned during World War II, and the 
mistreatment of people of Ukrainian origin during World War I. Section 4(b) of that 
Act provides:
4. Nothing in this Act shall be construed or applied so as to confer on the 
Governor in Council the power to make orders or regulations ...
(b) providing for the detention, imprisonment or internment of Canadian citi­
zens or permanent residents as defined in the Immigration Act on the basis of 
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical 
disability.
This provision focuses on detention, imprisonment and internment. Although the ref­
erence to imprisonment and internment represents a regrettable phase in Canadian 
history, it remains underinclusive to contemporary Canadian commitments to equal­
ity. Indeed, there is some danger that prohibiting the worst excesses of the past may 
implicitly open the door to other abuses that may in comparison seem less grave.
The reference to detention in the Emergencies Act tracks references to legal 
rights in ss.9 and 10 of the Charter and could be read fairly broadly. Nevertheless, 
there are concerns that the reference to detention is underinclusive of the discrimi­
natory practices that should be prohibited in a modem and multicultural Canada. For 
example, modem electronic technology allows various forms of intrusive searches to 
be conducted without detention of the search’s target. Another problem with the non­
discrimination clause in the Emergencies Act is that it only applies to Canadian citi­
zens and permanent residents. This section was drafted before the Supreme Court’s 
landmark decision in Andrews v. Law Society o f British Columbia47 that recognized 
all non-citizens, not just permanent residents, as an analogous and vulnerable group 
that is protected from discrimination. Finally, a simple declaratory anti-discrimina­
tion clause could be criticized as a symbolic gesture without teeth and one that only 
duplicates non-discrimination standards already found in human rights codes and the 
Charter.
45 S. Choudhry and K. Roach, “Racial and Ethnic Profiling: Statutory Discretion, Constitutional 
Remedies and Democratic Accountability” (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 293.
46 S.C. 1988, c. 29.
47 [1989] 1 S.C.R 143.
A more robust anti-discrimination and anti-profiling clause was proposed to 
the special Senate Committee on Bill C-36 in a brief prepared by my colleague Sujit 
Choudhry and myself in November, 2001. Drawing on a proposed American federal 
The End Racial Profiling Act o f 2001 that enjoyed bi-partisan support prior to 
September 11, we proposed the following amendment to the ATA:
Racial and Ethnic Profiling
Definitions
1. “racial and ethnic profiling” means the practice of a law enforcement agent 
relying, to any degree, on race, ethnicity, or national origin in selecting which 
individuals to subject to investigation or heightened scrutiny.
“law enforcement agent” includes any peace officer or person exercising law 
enforcement power under federal legislation;
“law enforcement agency” includes the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, 
Canadian Customs, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, and other police 
forces exercising powers under ss.82.28 and 83.3;
Ban on Racial and Ethnic Profiling
2. (a) No law enforcement agent or law enforcement agency shall engage in 
racial and ethnic profiling.
(b) Racial and ethnic profiling does not include reliance on race, ethnicity or 
national origin in combination with other identifying factors when the law 
enforcement agent is seeking to apprehend a specific suspect whose race, eth­
nicity, or national origin is part of the description of the suspect.
Enforcement
3. A finding that a law enforcement agent or law enforcement agency has 
engaged in racial and ethnic profiling shall allow a court to award any remedy 
that is appropriate and just in the circumstances including damages, injunctions, 
declarations and costs. In addition to the award of remedies, the court may 
also refer the matter to a human rights commission that has jurisdiction with 
respect to the particular law enforcement agent or law enforcement agency.
Data Collection
4. The Attorney General of Canada shall prepare and cause to be laid before 
Parliament and the Attorney General of every province shall publish or other­
wise make available to the public an annual report on racial profiling for the pre­
vious year. The report shall include:
(a) Any steps taken to ensure that law enforcement officers and law enforcement 
agencies not engage in racial and ethnic profiling;
(b) Data on enforcement practices that is sufficiently detailed to determine 
whether law enforcement agencies are engaged in racial and ethnic profiling; 
and
(c) Reports made under s.83.31 shall, subject to the exceptions in s.83.31(4)(a)-
(c),include information on the racial and ethnic origins of those subjected to 
investigative hearings under s.83.28 and preventive arrests under s.83.3.
Our proposal does not limit itself to the imprisonment, internment or detention of 
persons, but rather applies to all law enforcement powers under federal legislation. 
Thus search powers, powers of preventive arrest, and investigative hearings are 
included. Nevertheless, the reference to law enforcement may be underinclusive and 
should be expanded to include all forms of investigation. A private member’s bill 
before Parliament would extend the prohibition on racial profiling to custom, avia­
tion and immigration officials.48 It could be argued that the our proposal should also 
include other grounds of discrimination, notably religion and perhaps all the enu­
merated and firmly recognized analogous grounds of discrimination under s. 15 of the 
Charter. At the same time, our proposal applies to everyone, not just Canadian citi­
zens and permanent residents.
Our proposal adopts a broad definition of profiling that includes investigative 
decisions based in any part on race or ethnic origin. Some may argue that this is too 
broad a prohibition and one that may unduly restrain law enforcement. However, it 
would not, as has been suggested, prevent police and others from using race, ethnic­
ity or national origin when they are part of a description of a particular subject. The 
aforementioned private member’s bill has a narrower definition of profiling that pro­
hibits the use of stereotypes rather than reasonable suspicion in singling out individ­
uals for greater scrutiny or different treatment.49
Other important design issues for a non-discrimination clause include the col­
lection of profiling data and remedies. The ATA itself imposes data reporting require­
ments on provincial law enforcement authorities and could serve as a model for an 
anti-discrimination clause. Our proposal attempts to ensure that the reports include 
data about prevention and remedies for profiling and not just raw numbers reflecting 
what happened in the past. It includes existing restrictions on data reports that pro­
hibit reporting information injurious to ongoing investigations, dangerous to the life
48 Bill C-296, An Act to eliminate racial profiling, 1st Sess., 38th Pari., 2004 (first reading 18 
November 2004).
49 Ibid. s.2.
or safety of any person or prejudicial to a legal proceeding. It does not include the 
blanket restriction in s.83.31(4)(d) on information that would “otherwise be contrary 
to the public interest” because of concerns about the vagueness of the term “public 
interest”.50
Our proposal contemplates enforcement by both courts and human rights com­
missions. It enables courts to award appropriate and just remedies including dam­
ages, costs, injunctions and declarations. The anti-discrimination clause could also 
include a provision for sentence reductions, though this would only benefit those pro­
filing victims convicted of some offence. At the same time, it seems unwise to rely 
on expensive civil litigation before the Federal Court as the sole means of enforce­
ment. By allowing for the referral of some matters to the appropriate human rights 
commission, the wording of the clause recognizes that in some cases systemic reme­
dies such as training and education may provide the only lasting solution to problems 
of discriminatory profiling. Courts could also have the power to retain jurisdiction 
after ordering injunctions in some cases.51
6. The Need for Fairness and Non-Discrimination in the Treatment 
of Non-Citizen Terrorist Suspects
A non-discrimination or anti-profiling amendment to the ATA would go some 
of the way towards responding to concerns about the discriminatory application of 
anti-terrorism laws. However, such an amendment would not address Canada’s most 
controversial and draconian anti-terrorism measure: the use of immigration law as 
anti-terrorism law. An anti-discrimination clause that did not address the IRPA's dis­
parate treatment of citizen and non-citizen terror suspects would be little more than 
symbolic window-dressing.
A threshold issue for the three year review committee will be whether it should 
examine the anti-terrorism provision of the IRPA. Technically, section 145 of the 
ATA only requires a comprehensive review of the provisions and operation of the 
ATA and not the IRPA. Nevertheless, the practical operation of the ATA depends on 
the use of the immigration law as an alternative and indeed more frequently used 
anti-terrorism device. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized the importance of 
immigration proceedings in anti-terrorism efforts when it held the immunity provi­
sions for investigative hearings in the ATA underinclusive because they did not apply 
to deportation hearings.52 The three year review process might also be underinclusive 
if it ignored the operation of the anti-terrorism provisions of the IRPA.
50 R. v. Morales, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 711.
si Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3.
52 Re Application under s.83.28 of the Criminal Code, supra note 3 at paras. 74-76. I am indebted to 
Rayner Thwaites for bringing this point to my attention.
It is unfortunate that more connections were not drawn between the ATA and 
the IRPA in late 2001 when both laws were enacted.53 One ground of comparison is 
how each Act treats membership in a terrorist organization. Such membership is 
criminalized in the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act, 2000. Although much of the 
ATA is based on the UK Act, membership in a terrorist organization is not a crime 
under the ATA. Under s.34 of the IRPA, however, a non-citizen may be declared inad­
missible because he or she is “a member of an organization that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe engages, has engaged or will engage” in terrorism. The much 
lower standard of proof in immigration law aggravates the disparity between the 
treatment of citizens and the treatment of non-citizens under Canada’s anti-terrorism 
laws.
Another example of a disparity between the ATA and IRPA is with respect to 
preventive or investigative detention. Under s.58(l)(c) of the IRPA, immigration 
authorities can detain a non-citizen on the basis that “the Minister is taking necessary 
steps to inquire into a reasonable suspicion that they are inadmissible on grounds of 
security or for violating human or international human rights”. Detention under this 
provision, like preventive arrests under the ATA, is subject to review within 48 hours. 
However, investigative detention is much harsher under the IRPA because under the 
immigration law such detentions are capable of continuous extension by way of 30 
day reviews as opposed to the 72 hour outer limit on preventive arrest under the ATA. 
Canadian authorities used the power of investigative detention in connection with 
Project Thread, in which 21 non-citizens from South Asia were arrested to headline 
news of a suspected al Qaeda cell. It now appears that these people were guilty of, at 
most, typical immigration law violations. Their detention as suspected terrorists has 
forced some of them to claim refugee status. The use of harsher anti-terrorism laws 
against non-citizens than against citizens must be justified in light of concerns about 
discrimination and in light of the fact that the threat of terrorism is not limited to non­
citizens.
Security certificates are the most draconian instrument under the IRPA to deal 
with terrorist suspects who are not citizens. Section 78(g) of the IRPA specifically 
authorizes judges to consider information that if disclosed would injure national 
security in determining whether a Ministerial security certificate is reasonable. 
However, the reviewing judge may make his decision without disclosing even a sum­
mary of the information to the detainee. This can produce a situation where a judge 
makes a decision to deport a person from Canada on the basis of evidence not even 
summarized for the person and without any adversarial challenge to the evidence. In 
such a proceeding, the government presents evidence to the judge in a closed ex parte 
hearing. It should be noted that in upholding the predecessor of this section, the
53 But see Audrey Macklin, “Borderline Security” in The Security o f Freedom, supra note 5 at 383.
Supreme Court of Canada stressed the important role of the summary in treating the 
non-citizen fairly.54
The architecture of the ex parte and in camera procedures of the IRPA is dupli­
cated in several areas of the ATA. Similar provisions are found in ss.83.05 and 83.06 
of the Criminal Code, as amended by the ATA, and in ss. 5 and 6 of the Charities 
Registration (Security Information) Act also enacted by the ATA. In addition, ss. 
38.06 and 38.13 of the Canada Evidence Act (CEA), as amended by the ATA, also 
contemplate that evidence in criminal terrorism proceedings may not be disclosed to 
the accused.55 An important difference between criminal law and immigration law, 
however, is that s.38.14 of the CEA specifically contemplates a criminal trial judge 
ordering a stay of proceedings56 to protect the accused’s right to a fair trial. No such 
provision is found in the IRPA, even though immigration proceedings can result in 
prolonged detention and possibly deportation to face torture.
The Federal Court of Appeal’s recent decision in Charkaoui v. Canada, reject­
ing a Charter challenge to security certificates, does not end the case for reform. 
Although it recognized that security certificate procedures “derogate in a significant 
way from the adversarial process normally adhered to in criminal and civil mat­
ters”57, the Federal Court of Appeal maintained that the procedures did not violate s.7 
of the Charter. The Court relied on the government’s duty to make full disclosure of 
the facts in its possession and the judge’s “pro-active role in the interest of ensuring 
fairness” to make this finding.58 Decary and Letoumeau JJ.A. argued:
the threat of terrorism or a threat to national security does not represent or reflect 
a situation of normality, at least not in our country....If we were to accept the 
appellant’s position that national security cannot justify any derogations from the 
rules governing adversarial proceedings we would be reading into the 
Constitution of Canada an abandonment by the community as a whole of its right 
to survival in the name of a blind absolutism of the individual rights enshrined
54 Chiarelli v. Canada, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 711 at 745-746.
55 Although s.38.06 allows for balancing of the competing interests in national security and the need 
for disclosure, the Federal Court of Appeal has suggested that it may only allow disclosure o f national 
security information in cases where innocence is at stake. R. v. Ribic, 2003 FCA 246 at para. 27. An 
Attorney General’s certificate under 38.13 would preclude any balancing of competing interests.
56 A criminal trial judge, however, might have difficulty concluding that a stay was necessary because 
a fair trial was impossible when that judge might not even have access to the information that is not 
disclosed to the accused under either ss.38.06 or 38.13.
57 Charkaoui v. Canada, 2004 FCA 421 at para. 75.
58 Ibid. at para. 80.
in that Constitution. We fail to discern any legislative intention along those lines, 
quite the contrary.59
These passages embrace what has aptly been called “the permanence of the tempo­
rary.”60 They suggest that the new normal after 9/11 will be a permanent state of 
emergency, in which the government can derogate from the rights of non-citizens 
without having to justify its actions under s. 1 of the Charter and without using the 
constitutional override under s.33. The Federal Court of Appeal stresses the public’s 
interest in indefinitely incapacitating non-citizen terrorist suspects over the need to 
ensure that such suspects receive fair treatment. Key to such fair treatment is the sus­
pects’ right to mount an adversarial challenge to government’s case against them, a 
case that may be based on faulty intelligence either from governments or from ter­
rorists who are being held under extreme conditions. Miscarriages of justice in past 
terrorism cases resulted in large part because the state did not disclose all the evi­
dence to the accused.61 If such miscarriages can occur in criminal trials and appeals, 
they can certainly occur under the truncated procedures of the immigration law. 62
59 Ibid. at para. 84.
60 D. Dyzenhaus, “The Permanence of the Temporary: Can Emergency Powers Be Normalized?” in The 
Security o f Freedom, supra note 5 at 21.
61 See K. Roach and G. Trotter, “Miscarriages of Justice in the War Against Terror” (2005) 134 Penn. 
St. L. Rev. (forthcoming) for an examination of the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four, Maguire Seven 
and Judith Ward cases, all involving wrongful convictions for IRA bombings. We also argue that con­
temporary miscarriages of justice in terrorism cases are probably more likely to occur in immigration 
proceedings such as the security certificate process than under the criminal law. For example, the 
Federal Court in Charkaoui, supra note 57, at paras. 17-18, indicates that the applicant was recognized 
in photographs by two terrorists as having been present in training camps in Afghanistan, but no detail 
is provided on the conditions and methods of identification. On the frailties of eyewitness identifica­
tion and proper procedures for using multiple photos for identification purposes see Hon. Peter Cory, 
The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow (Winnipeg: Queens Printer, 2001). Combatant status review 
tribunals have recently been held to violate the guarantee of due process under the 5th Amendment of 
the American Bill of Rights, in large part because the failure to disclose classified information to 
detainees deprived them of the ability to effectively contest the allegations made against them and, in 
particular, to contest the credibility and significance of statements against them that may have been 
obtained through torture or coercion. In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases 31 Jan. 2005 (U.S.D.C.) per 
Green J.
62 For contrasting views about the ability of designated judges to probe the evidence offered in the 
security certificate process in the absence of adversarial challenge, compare the confidence expressed 
by the Federal Court o f Appeal in Charkaoui, supra note 57 at para. 80 in the judge’s “pro-active 
role in the interest of ensuring fairness” with the statements of Judge Hugessen of the Federal Court 
Trial Division that “we do not like this process o f .. .having to try for ourselves to see how the witnesses 
that appear before us ought to be cross-examined...If you have a case that is only being presented on 
one side, you are not going to get a good case....I sometimes feel like a bit of a fig leaf.” J. Hugessen, 
“Watching the Watchers: Democratic Oversight” in Terrorism, Law and Democracy supra note 5 at 
384-386.
The Federal Court of Appeal’s impassioned defence of security certificates as 
a means to prevent terrorism seems simplistic in light of Canada’s new national secu­
rity policy. That policy aims to protect Canadians both at home and abroad and 
stresses linkages between the international environment and threats of terrorism in 
Canada. The detention and deportation of non-citizen terrorist suspects is not a magic 
bullet that can protect us from terrorism. Indeed, in a world of international terror­
ism, the deportation of such suspects may not even ensure the security of Canadians, 
to say nothing of others.
The House of Lord’s recent landmark decision in A. v. Secretary o f State fo r  
the Home Department63 also underlines the need for Canadians to rethink reliance on 
immigration law to deal with terrorist suspects. The impugned law in A allowed 
British authorities to detain non-citizen terrorist suspects indefinitely where they 
could not be deported because of concerns that they would be tortured, and where 
another country would not accept the person. It was enacted shortly after 9/11, sub­
ject to a formal derogation from fair trial rights, but not equality rights. In an 8:1 
decision the House of Lords found that the derogation was disproportionate to the 
terrorist threat and discriminated against non-citizens. Although the legal details are 
different, the major principles articulated in the judgment could apply in the 
Canadian context.
Many of the Law Lords stressed that the government could not justify a harsh 
law that only applied to non-citizens suspected of terrorism when it was clear that 
some British citizens were also terrorist suspects. This approach, which requires the 
government to treat citizens and non-citizens equally, finds support in the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s first equality rights case, which recognized that non-citizens were 
a group particularly vulnerable to discrimination because of their lack of political 
power. Warnings from both the United Nations Human Rights Commission and the 
Inter-American Human Rights Commissions about the dangers of discrimination 
against non-citizens and related dangers of ethnic and cultural stereotyping and pro­
filing in anti-terrorism efforts were also considered by the House of Lords.64 The 
mere fact that non-citizens do not have a right to remain in Canada is not a satisfac­
tory basis on which to decide the issue of discrimination.65 Rather, the focus should 
be on the truncated procedures and indefinite detention of non-citizen terrorist sus­
pects that is allowed under Canadian immigration law. It is not fair and equal to 
impose the risk of harsh treatment and perhaps erroneous determination of terrorist 
connections on non-citizens simply because they are already disadvantaged in
63 [2004] UKHL 56.
64 Ibid. at paras 62, 69.
65 Chiarelli v. Canada, supra note 54 at 733-734.
Canadian law and politics. The immigration law shortcut in dealing with terrorist 
suspects raises the question of why we enacted the ATA with its many new offences, 
restrictions on the use of national security information and investigative powers. If 
the ATA is so necessary and valuable, why rely on the short-cuts and displacement 
strategies of the IRPA1
The British law that was held disproportionate and discriminatory in A was 
enacted in part because the British government to its credit accepted that its com­
mitments to human rights precluded deporting a terrorist suspect to torture. Hence, 
the impugned indefinite detention regime was deemed by the government to be nec­
essary to deal with terrorist suspects who could not be deported because they would 
be tortured. The British government now has decided to follow the House of Lords 
decision and repeal the indefinite detention for terrorist suspects who cannot be 
deported and replace it with a new system of control orders that applies to both citi­
zens and non-citizens.66 Control orders were rightly very controversial in Britain and 
the government responded to this controversy by providing that the law would expire 
in one year.
Are British-style control orders needed in Canada? In my view, they are not. 
Preventive arrests, including recognizances of one year duration, are already avail­
able under s.83.3 of the Criminal Code, as added by the ATA. Unlike British control 
orders, s.83.3 has the virtue of requiring prior judicial authorization in all cases and 
a requirement of reasonable grounds to believe that a terrorist activity will be carried 
out.67 This is not to suggest that preventive arrests are benign. Even the judicial 
imposition of conditions on the basis of reasonable suspicions is not something to be 
taken lightly. The use of such powers is appropriately subject to approval by an 
Attorney General, special reporting conditions and a renewable five year sunset. 
Nevertheless, release subject to peace bond type conditions is a more proportionate 
restriction of liberty than the security certificate process under the IRPA which places 
no explicit limits on detention and allows non-citizens to be detained for years before 
they are deported and does not clearly instruct judges to impose only proportionate
66 Prevention o f Terrorism Act 2005 (U.K.), 2005, c.2.
67 Section 83.3 (8) of the Criminal Code allows a provincial court judge to order that a person enter 
into a recognizance for up to 12 months. The order may be made if the judge is satisfied there are rea­
sonable grounds to suspect that such conditions are necessary to prevent the person carrying out a ter­
rorist activity.
restrictions on liberty. 68 The Canadian government has not demonstrated the neces­
sity for British-style control orders.
The Supreme Court in Suresh v. Canada69 refused to say that deportation to 
torture would always be unconstitutional and held out the possibility that undefined 
exceptional circumstances might make such action constitutional even without 
explicit statutory authorization or an explicit override of Charter rights. The combi­
nation of the Suresh torture possibility with the security certificate process means 
that Canada lags well behind Britain in treating non-citizens suspected of terrorism 
in a fair manner consistent with international standards of non-discrimination and 
protection against torture. The idea that deportation to torture could be constitution­
al in Canada is something of an international embarrassment. The Government of 
Canada should, through an amendment to the IRPA, commit itself to never seeking 
to make use of the Suresh exception concerning deportation to torture.
7. The Need for Special Advocates
Michael Ignatieff has stressed the importance of “adversarial review procedures” 
even within each branch of government70 in the new battle against terrorism. 
Adversarial review procedures, however, are absent in parts of the security certificate 
process and in other parts of the ATA. Two main concerns arise. The first is that there 
will not be adversarial contest to determine whether evidence can legitimately be dis­
closed to the affected party without adversely affecting national security. The sec­
ond is that evidence that cannot be disclosed for valid national security reasons will 
not be subject to adversarial challenge and testing. In my view, a group of security
68 Adil Charkaoui, a man detained under a security certificate for more than 20 months, has recently 
been released subject to strict conditions. Re Charkaoui, 2005 FC 248 (T.D.). This decision is consis­
tent with a recent New Zealand case holding that the legislature had not clearly precluded the possi­
bility of bail under their version of security certificates. Zaoui v. The Attorney General (Supreme Court 
o f New Zealand, 25 Nov. 2004) [Zaoui]. The New Zealand Supreme Court stressed that it was possi­
ble for a person to be determined a danger to the security o f New Zealand if allowed to remain in the 
country while still not being an immediate danger if released on fixed conditions for the duration of the 
lengthy proceedings. Ibid. at para. 66. The Federal Court of Appeal has noted that the complex grounds 
for detaining those under a security certificate are “an overlapping and entanglement of the notions of 
public danger, danger to public safety or security, danger to the security of Canada, danger to national 
security, detriment to the riational interest and danger to the safety of any person: a veritable abstract 
work of art in which everyone can see or discover what they wish.” Re Charkaoui, 2004 FCA 421 at 
para. 118. Despite this recognition, the court rejected the argument that the security certificate process 
violated the Charter because it deprived detainees of the right to bail.
69 [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 at para. 78. For my criticisms of this exception and arguments that it should be 
considered a derogation from rights under the Charter and international law see my “Constitutional, 
Remedial and International Dialogues About Rights: The Canadian Experience” (2005) 40 Tex. Int’l 
L.J. (forthcoming).
70 M. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil (Toronto: Penguin Canada, 2004) at 10.
cleared lawyers or special advocates could play a valuable role in challenging the 
government’s case with respect to both types of decisions. Special advocates should 
be senior and independent lawyers who are Queens Counsel, or their equivalent and 
who could receive a high level security clearance. Such a group could serve as a form 
of Loyal Opposition whenever proceedings are conducted in an ex parte manner 
because of national security concerns. Special advocates could build on the 
admirable tradition that senior and respected barristers can act as one of Her 
Majesty’s counsel even while they vigourously oppose measures undertaken by 
lawyers representing the government of the day. Special advocates could help oppose 
a culture of secrecy and risk aversion that can develop in the absence of full adver­
sarial challenge.
The McDonald Commission considered an earlier version of the special advo­
cate procedure in its 1981 report. It concluded that “the adversarial element afforded 
by such a procedure might be rather artificial and would make the process of approv­
ing applications unduly complex...an experienced judge is capable of giving ade­
quate consideration to all relevant aspects of an application without the assistance of 
an adversarial procedure.”71 These recommendations were made almost a quarter of 
a century ago without the benefit of a model such as the more recent British special 
advocate procedure. Many contemporary factors, such as the possibility of long-term 
security certificate detention, the knowledge that non-disclosure of evidence has led 
to miscarriages of justice in past terrorism cases,72 and concerns about the reliability 
of intelligence obtained through the use of extreme interrogation techniques abroad 
all suggest that there is a need today for full adversarial challenge of the govern­
ment’s case for a security certificate.
Canadian courts have so far been reluctant to appoint such special advocates. 
To my knowledge, there has only been one case in which a court allowed a security 
cleared lawyer, employed by the Attorney General of Canada, to serve as a special 
advocate.73 The Federal Court of Appeal has adverted to the British experience with
71 Canada, Commission o f Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities o f the RCMP Second Report, vol. 1 
(Ottawa: Queens Printer, 1981) at 586.
72 United States o f America v. Bums, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283; Roach and Trotter “Miscarriages of Justice 
in the War Against Terror” supra note 61.
73 For a decision refusing to appoint a respected lawyer to serve as a amicus curiae in a security cer­
tificate case see Re Harkat, 2004 FC 1717 at para. 42, on the basis that such a procedure is not con­
sistent with the intent of Parliament, was made late in the proceedings and was not necessary because 
of the proactive role of the designated judge. Note that a security cleared lawyer employed by the fed­
eral government was appointed as an amicus in at least one criminal case in which evidence could not 
be disclosed to the accused by virtue of national security concerns under s.38 of the Canada Evidence 
Act. The courts recognized that having a lawyer from government serve as a special advocate was not 
ideal, but was the only practical route given the on-going criminal trial and the length of time required 
for private counsel including the accused’s lawyers to receive security clearances. Canada (Attorney 
General) v. Ribic, 2003 FCA 246 at paras. 42-45, 54.
special advocates, but concluded that it was a policy matter for Parliament.74 The 
courts are looking to Parliament for leadership on the issue of special advocates.
Should Parliament establish something like the British special advocate proce­
dure, detainees’ lawyers should still have access to as much as the government’ case 
as possible, and they should continue to challenge that case. This is desirable because 
special advocates will be unable to discuss the national security information with 
their nominal client. It will be important for special advocates to have access to their 
nominal clients before they receive protected information. They should also have 
access to security-cleared experts and even security-cleared surrogate clients who 
can provide them with additional background information about relevant countries in 
which the government alleges their nominal clients engaged in terrorism. At the same 
time, special advocates will continue to be at a disadvantage because they will be 
unable to hear the affected person’s response to the national security information. In 
addition, open hearings should be held wherever possible.75 The special advocate 
approach is not perfect in all respects, but it would help ensure that information that 
is not disclosed because of concerns about national security would be subject to 
adversarial challenge.
An alternative that is sometimes used in the United States where courts allow 
the detainee’s lawyer to obtain the necessary security clearance, something that 
should be possible given the duration of most security certificate cases.76 In such 
cases, however, lawyers cannot discuss classified information with their clients. This 
raises serious ethical issues about distorting the solicitor-client relationship.77
74 Re Charkaoui, supra note 57 at para. 124.
75 For adverse judicial comments on the mandatory in camera provisions in ss.38.02 and 38.11 of the 
Canada Evidence Act see Ottawa Citizen Group v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FC 1052 at paras. 
34-35, 38 (T.D.). See also Ruby v. Canada, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 3 at paras. 52-60.
76 In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (U.S.D.C. 2005) (Green J.). The Federal 
Court of Appeal has concluded that it is “impractical” for lawyers to obtain security clearances in the 
middle of a criminal trial. Canada (Attorney General) v. Ribic, 2003 FCA 246 at para. 55.
77 In Re Vancouver Sun, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 332 at para. 49, the Supreme Court seemed to disapprove of 
a judge’s order that counsel for the accused in the Air India be able to attend an investigative hearing 
of a potential Crown witness but not discuss the content of the investigative hearing with their clients. 
Iacobucci and Arbour JJ. stated that it was “difficult...to understand how the public good is better 
served by the qualified participation of professionals who cannot discharge fully their publicly entrust­
ed mandate. In any event, these issues can be left for another day, and should be debated amongst the 
professional bodies involved so that court-imposed conditions can properly consider ethical standards 
and best practices in the professions involved.”
8. Conclusion
The three year review of the ATA provides Canadians with an excellent opportunity 
to ensure that the ATA and related anti-terrorism legislation accord with the goals of 
Canada’s evolving national security policy. The government should give serious 
thought to narrowing the definition of terrorist activities to focus on the essence of 
the terrorist threat: violence to innocent civilians. Such a revision would respond to 
the risk that unlawful protests could legally constitute terrorism and that resources 
could be misallocated to groups that, while they might satisfy present broad defini­
tions of terrorism, present less serious threats to human security than terrorists intent 
on murder and maiming. A more minimal reform would be removal of the following 
controversial references in the description of “terrorist activity” in the ATA: disrup­
tions of public and private services, the requirement for political and religious 
motive, and the reference to crimes intended to influence the behaviour of persons as 
opposed to governments and organizations. In addition to revisions of the definition 
of terrorist activities, a few overbroad offences in the ATA and the SIA could be 
defined in more precise and narrower terms to ensure fairness and appropriate tar­
geting. The process of listing terrorist groups could be improved by ensuring that 
individuals are not listed; ensuring that executive designation as a terrorist group is 
open to challenge in subsequent criminal proceedings; and providing for ex ante 
adversarial challenge to the government’s case.
Canada should ensure that its anti-terrorism efforts advance the goals of non­
discrimination by including an anti-discrimination and anti-profiling clause in the 
ATA. It should also make this commitment real by reconsidering the security certifi­
cate process. This process, at present, could result in a terrorist suspect’s detention 
for years and then, on the basis of evidence not disclosed or even summarized for 
him, deportation, possibly to torture. One reform would be to allow security cleared 
special advocates to challenge those parts of the governments case not disclosed to 
the affected party. Such adversarial challenges could help improve both the fairness 
and accuracy of the government’s anti-terrorism efforts.
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